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make sense for security purposes, they have a pair of troubling side effects: Individuals may be
listed by mistake, and once on a list it is not easy to get off. This Note argues that all people kept
from working or traveling by government use of terrorist watchlists have a due process right to
receive meaningful procedural protections, including notice of their status and a fair hearing.
The Note then proposes model procedures that protect both constitutional liberties and national
security.
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INTRODUCTION
What does Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts have in
common with Republican Congressman Donald Young of Alaska? Watchlists
maintained by the United States government have kept them both from flying.
In the spring of 2004, airline agents tried to block Senator Kennedy from
boarding airplanes on five occasions because his name appeared on a federal
terrorist watchlist.' In September 2004, Young faced similar frustrations when
he attempted to catch an Alaska Airlines flight.'
These members of Congress are not alone. Since 9/11, the U.S. government
has placed thousands of American travelers on the No Fly List3 as part of a
massive security initiative that affects all of the nearly seven hundred million
passengers who fly within the United States annually.4 The government
performs watchlist-based security threat assessments on each of these airline
passengers, as well as millions of other individuals employed in the
transportation industry, by checking each passenger's or employee's name
against one or more terrorist watchlists.'
1. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2004, at Ai;
Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at Airport, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2004, atAi.
2. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Committee Chairman Runs Into Watch-List Problem, WASH. POST, Sept.
30, 2004, at A17.
. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2004, at A8.
4. This figure is projected to pass one billion passengers by the end of the decade. Press
Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Forecasts Passenger Levels To Top One Billion in the
Next Decade (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www.faa.gov/apa/pr/pr.cfm?id=1932.
5. The use of government watchlists extends far beyond the transportation sector. A provision
of the Patriot Act mandates that nonprofit organizations check employees' names against
government terrorist watchlists to be eligible to receive contributions through the
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a program allowing federal employees to donate to
nonprofit organizations through payroll deductions. See Memorandum from Mara T.
Patermaster, Dir., Office of CFC Operations, Office of Pers. Mgmt., to All 2004 CFC
Applicants, New Certification for 2004 CFC Application (2003), available at
http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2oo3/2o03-io.asp. Watchlists are also used to screen
foreign visitors and immigrants through the US-VISIT program. See Dep't of Homeland
Sec., US-VISIT Q&As: Information Collection & Use, http://www.dhs.gov/
dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_o525.xml (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). The State
Department maintains a watchlist of foreign terrorist organizations. See Off. of
Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Aug. 12,
2004), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2oo4/35167.htm. And the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) keeps a watchlist for freezing and
blocking terrorist assets. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
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These measures make sense for security purposes, but have a pair of
troubling side effects: People may be listed by mistake, and once on a list it is
not easy to get off. It took Senator Kennedy several phone calls to high level
officials in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As Kennedy said at a
Judiciary Committee hearing: If the DHS has "that kind of difficulty with a
member of Congress, how in the world are average Americans, who are getting
caught up in this thing, how are they going to be treated fairly and not have
their rights abused?"
6
In December of 2004, in response to a recommendation of the 9/11
Commission, Congress included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 a brief clause requiring that the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the division of DHS
responsible for the transportation sector, "establish a procedure to enable
airline passengers, who are delayed or prohibited from boarding a flight"
because the watchlist showed they might pose a security threat to "appeal such
determination and correct information contained in the system."7 The Act,
however, did not give specific guidance to the agency or require a formal
hearing, nor did it cover transportation-sector employees affected by
watchlists.
The agency has yet to act. The government has objected that granting
watchlisted individuals the core elements of due process-notice and a fair
hearing-would threaten transportation security and require disclosure of
classified information. But a fair process need not do so. Drawing on the
Supreme Court's invitation to develop narrowly tailored procedures, and
programs designed by Congress in other contexts, this Note proposes a
balanced approach that would allow for pretravel clearance and a fair hearing
for travelers and employees alike, without endangering homeland security.
8
Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Persons, http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/sdn (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
6. See Swarns, supra note 1; see also Lolita C. Baldor, Terror List Snag Nearly Grounded Ted
Kennedy, Assoc. PRESs, Aug. 20, 2004, available at http://2o 7.114.199.161/news/3336.html.
7. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, Pub. L. No. io8-458,
§ 4012(a)(1)(C)(iii)(I), 118 Star. 3638, 3715 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.S.
§ 449o3(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I) (LexisNexis 2005)). The section of the Act pertaining to the use of a
No Transport List for cruise ship travelers only requires a process for misidentified persons,
not persons incorrectly placed on this list. Id. 5 4071(c)(2).
S. While my proposals could apply to all watchlist-based security programs, I focus on the
transportation sector because transportation watchlists affect the fundamental liberties of
large numbers of people already inside the United States, including citizens and lawful
permanent residents.
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The Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly describes the value of
terrorist watchlists and how they are created. Part II argues that travelers and
transportation employees adversely affected by watchlists are entitled to due
process because of their constitutional liberty interests in travel, employment,
and avoiding the stigma of being identified as a potential terrorist. Part III
proposes and describes specially tailored notice and hearing mechanisms for
individuals on watchlists. The Conclusion considers the proper role for
Congress and the courts in implementing these proposals.
I. WATCHLIST-BASED SECURITY
A. The Value of Watchlists
Today's transportation watchlist system, had it been in place at the time,
might have prevented the 9/11 attacks.9 Watchlists not only provide an
effective layer of security, but are also relatively cheap, efficient, and
noninvasive. The expense of running names through a computer database
pales in comparison to the cost of hiring extra law enforcement officers or
checkpoint screeners. And for most people the delay, inconvenience, and
privacy invasion of submitting to a watchlist check is far smaller than that
imposed by other security methods, such as the full-body pat-downs in vogue
at some airports, 10 or the behavioral profiling used in select airports and other
mass transit systems."
Watchlists are becoming more effective as technological and policy
innovations make the lists more difficult to evade. New programs like the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) (for employees),
US-VISIT (for people entering the country), and Registered Traveler (for
frequent fliers) all use fingerprints or iris scans to confirm identities, making
9. As the 9/11 Commission reported, "[o]n 9/11, the 19 hijackers were screened by a computer-
assisted screening system called CAPPS. More than half were identified for further
inspection." NAT'L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 392 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. The watchlist failed in that case
because the follow-up was limited to searching luggage, not more extensive precautions. Id.
Under the current regulations, the individuals would have been selected for extra searches at
a minimum, and perhaps kept off the airplanes.,
10. See Joe Sharkey, Many Women Say Airport Pat-Downs Are a Humiliation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2004, at Al.
ii. See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Metro Officers Keep a Keen Eye on Riders, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2005,
at A6 (noting that security officials in some mass transit systems and airports use behavioral
profiling to decide which passengers to question or detain).
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this form of security more effective and less susceptible to fraud. 2 New TSA
regulations require commercial drivers holding hazardous materials
endorsements (HMEs) to give fingerprints. 3 And Congress has passed
legislation standardizing requirements for state driver's licenses.' 4 These
technological and policy developments- which make the link between people
and names more accurate - make the use of watchlists more effective.
B. The Expansion of Watchlists
As watchlists have become more effective, they have expanded dramatically
in size and scope. Although an early version of the No Fly List dates back to the
198os, it contained only sixteen names on September 11, 2001. Since then, the
number of names has grown exponentially: Leaks from agency officials and
newspaper reports have put the number as high as 325,ooo names.'5 The No
Fly List has also been transformed into a broad No Transport List: An
addendum to the 9/11 Commission Report urged the government to check
1a. Under the Registered Traveler program, TSA collects personal information from
applicants -including names, addresses, and phone numbers-along with biometric data
such as fingerprints or iris scans. TSA then assesses whether the traveler poses a threat, a
process that includes checking "intelligence data sources" and watchlists. Approved
registered travelers go through an expedited security screening process during which they
provide a Registered Traveler Smart Card with the biometric information for identity
confirmation. The program has been piloted at individual airports and is being expanded
nationwide. See Press Release, Transp. Security Admin., TSA Announces Key Elements of
Registered Traveler Program (Jan. 20, 20o6), available at http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=44&content=o9ooo5198oxao36; Transportation Security Administration,
What is Registered Traveler?, http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/RT-Factsheet.pdf
(last visited Apr. 11, 20o6). Rejected registered traveler applicants receive the same process
as those on watchlists. See infra Section I.D.
13. Security Threat Assessment for Individuals Applying for a Hazardous Materials
Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers License, 69 Fed. Reg. 17,969 (Apr. 6, 2004)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. 1572.9 (2005)). In addition, the IRTPA requires DHS to research how
to better use biometric technology in airports to screen both transportation employees and
travelers. IRTPA, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4011(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3712 (2004).
14. REAL ID Act of 2oo5, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 231, 311 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. §
3301 note (West 2oo5)).
is. Walter Pincus & Dan Eggen, 325,000 Names on Terrorism List: Rights Groups Say Database
May Include Innocent People, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 20o6, at Ai; Press Release, ACLU, TSA
and FBI To Pay $200,000 in Attorneys' Fees To Settle "No Fly" Lawsuit (Gordon v. FBI)
(Jan. 24, 20o6) (noting that TSA had released some information on the growth of the lists
after 9/11 in response to an ACLU Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit), available at
http://www.aclunc.org/pressrel/o6o123-nofly.html.
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Amtrak and cruise ship travelers' names against watchlists,16 and Congress
implemented this suggestion as part of IRTPA.
17
The expansion and proliferation of watchlists extends beyond travelers to
transportation workers. Various statutes and agency regulations require TSA to
check terrorist watchlists for airline pilots, 8 people who work at airports, 9
helicopter pilots,2" commercial truck drivers holding HMEs (an estimated 2.9
million Americans), 2 and maritime, cruise ship, and port workers.' The
16. See 9/11 Panel: TSA Needs a Plan for Attacks, Assoc. PREss, Sept. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.conmwp-dyn/article/A7743-2oo4Sep9_2html.
17. IRTPA § 4071(a)(1). The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to "compare[]
information about passengers and crew who are to be carried aboard a cruise ship with a
comprehensive, consolidated database containing information about known or suspected
terrorists and their associates" and also to use "information obtained by comparing the
passenger and crew information with the information in the database to prevent known or
suspected terrorists and their associates from boarding such ships or to subject them to
specific additional security scrutiny, through the use of 'no transport' and 'automatic
selectee' lists or other means."
18. Vision ioo-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2561
(2003) (codified at 49 U.S.C.S. § 46111 (LexisNexis 2004)); see also Coalition of Airline
Pilots Ass'ns v. FAA, 370 F. 3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir.
2004). TSA issued a regulation on January 24, 2003 explaining that "[i]n the course of
carrying out this responsibility, TSA receives information from other federal agencies and
other sources identifying specific individuals who pose security threats." Threat
Assessments Regarding Citizens of the United States Who Hold or Apply for FAA
Certificates, 68 Fed. Reg. 3756, 3756-57 (Jan. 24, 2003).
ig. IRTPA requires watchlist-based screening of all transportation employees certified by the
FAA or those with unescorted access to the secure area or air operations area of an airport.
IRTPA § 4012(a)(1). The Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. § 114
(Supp. I 2001), also requires TSA to perform background checks on "airport security
screening personnel, individuals with access to secure areas of airports, and other
transportation security personnel." Id. § 114(f)(12). TSA regulations and security directives
require security threat assessments for these transportation-sector workers. See, e.g., 49
C.F.R. § 1542.209 (2005) (airport operators, users, and others with access); id. §§ 1544.1oi,
.229, .230 (aircraft operator employees); id. § 1546.1Ol (foreign air carrier employees); id. §
1548.5 (indirect air carrier and air cargo employees).
2o. Eric Lichtblau & Michael Luo, U.S. Security Officers Will Take Over Passenger Screening on
Helicopter Tours, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1O, 2004, at A14 ("The helicopter tour operators will also
be required to provide the names of passengers to the federal government to run against
federal 'no fly' lists of terrorist suspects and to provide names and data on their owrd
employees for federal background checks.").
21. See USA PATRIOT Act, 49 U.S.C. § 51o3 a (Supp. I 2001). The regulation implementing
this statute states that "before determining that an individual [who holds or applies for an
HME] does not pose a security threat warranting denial of an authorization," the agency
must check international databases, TSA watchlists, and "other databases relevant to
21 ,i Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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checks may eventually expand to include all transportation workers at seaports,
airports, and rail, pipeline, trucking, and mass transit facilities.
C. How the Lists Work
The government does not comment on how it decides whether to put an
individual on a watchlist, and lawsuits to compel disclosure of this information
have failed.2" Yet some basic information is publicly available. The public
record suggests that the federal watchlists are largely compiled from classified
evidence collected by confidential sources. 4 Although the No Fly List is
maintained by TSA, it is based on information from other government
agencies,2" in particular the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). 6 The
determining whether an applicant poses or is suspected of posing a security threat or that
confirm an individual's identity." 49 C.F.R. § 1572.107 (2004).
2. See Maritime Transportation Security Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 70105(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2005).
TSA has begun to implement this statutory requirement through its TWIC program. The
statute provides that the government can only issue these cards to employees after making a
determination that they do not pose a "terrorism security risk." Id. S 70105(c). To that end,
the statute authorizes background checks against watchlists, including "[r]eview of any
other national security-related information or database." Id. § 7oo 5(d)(2)(D); Press
Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA To Test New ID Card for Transportation Workers
(Aug. 10, 2004), available at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=44&content=
o90005198oociobd.
23. The ACLU sued the FBI and TSA under FOIA, demanding that they release information
about the compilation and maintenance of the No Fly List, but the parties settled the case
with limited disclosure. See Stipulation of Compromise and Settlement of Plaintiffs' Claim
for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Order, Gordon v. FBI, No. C-o3-1779 CRB (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2006). In another case, a private plaintiff alleged that airport security was governed
by "secret laws," but his constitutional challenges were rejected in part on the merits and in
part for lack of standing. See Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. CV-o2-o 344 4-SI ( 9th Cir. Jan. 26,
2006) (rejecting the plaintiffs constitutional claims about identification requirements, and
dismissing other claims about the watchlists for lack of standing).
24. The TSA regulation implementing security assessments on pilots, for example, explicitly
states that, "[i] n most cases, the determination that an individual poses a security threat will
be based, in large part or exclusively, on classified national security information, unclassified
information designated as SSI [Sensitive Security Information], or other information that is
protected from disclosure by law." Threat Assessments Regarding Citizens of the United
States Who Hold or Apply for FAA Certificates, 68 Fed. Reg. 3756, 3758 (Jan. 24, 2003); see
also 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115 (2005).
25. TSA's website states that the watchlists are "based on recommendations and information
received from Federal agencies, including intelligence and law enforcement agencies." TSA
Watch Lists Clearance Procedures, http://www.tsa.gov/public/displaytheme=157&content
=o9ooo98oofb8af (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
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nation's foreign intelligence agencies now readily share leads with the FBI,
including intelligence information collected through controversial means, such
as the NSA's domestic surveillance programs.27
More information is available about how the list works.28 Currently, the
government sends updated versions of the No Fly List to airlines, who are then
responsible for checking passengers' names against the list? 9 TSA has long
planned to take over administration of the No Fly List, at first through the
CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System) program,30
and now through its successor known as Secure Flight. 1 The IRTPA required
a6. The Bush Administration inaugurated the TSC in September 2003 to "ensure that America's
government screeners are working from the same unified set of anti-terrorist information."
Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: The Terrorist Screening Center (Sept.
16, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=1598; see
also INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION Acr FOR FIscAL YEAR 2004, H.R. REP. No. 1O8-381,
9 36o(a)-(b) (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (requiring a report on the TSC to ensure that it does not
violate the Constitution or any other law, and requesting information about the possibility
of including more databases in the TSC).
27. Lowell Bergman et al., Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led F.B.L to Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 20o6, at Ai.
a8. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 392-93.
29. Statutory authorization for the No Fly List is 49 U.S.C. § 114 (h) (Supp. I 2001). TSA is
instructed to "enter into memoranda of understanding with Federal agencies or other
entities to share or otherwise cross-check as necessary data on individuals identified on
Federal agency databases who may pose a risk to transportation or national security" and to
notify "airport or airline security officers of the identity of individuals known to pose, or
suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger
safety." Id. TSA is also directed to establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers "to
use information from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who
may be a threat to civil aviation or national security" and to "prevent the individual[s] from
boarding an aircraft." Id. The lists themselves are authorized by Security Directives, issued
by TSA without notice or comment. See Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. CV-o2-o3444-SI, slip op.
at 1144 ( 9 th Cir. Jan. 26, 2006).
30. In July 2004, DHS announced that it was significantly modifying CAPPS II: "After a
significant review of TSA's proposed CAPPS II system, DHS is nearing completion of a
next-generation passenger prescreening program that meets our goals of using the
expanded no-fly and selectee lists to keep known or suspected terrorists off of planes .... "
The 9/11 Commission and Recommendations for the Future of Federal Law Enforcement and
Border Security: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary, io8th Cong. 11 (2004)
(statement of Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearing.cfm?id=1291.
31. Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA To Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System
(Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=44&content=
090005198ooc6c77; see also Rachel L. Swarns, Government To Take Over Watch-List
Screening, N.Y. TLMES, Aug. 17, 2004, at A14.
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that TSA begin testing this program by January 1, 2005 and that it assume the
passenger prescreening function within 18o days of completing the testing,32
but the development continues to be delayed.33 A TSA press release notes that,
once Secure Flight "is phased in, TSA will be able to check passenger records
against watch list information not previously available to airlines.
34
The secrecy of the administration of the watchlists- important for security
purposes -leaves many questions unanswered. How many people are on the
No Fly List (and not allowed to fly at all) as compared to the Selectee List (and
subject only to additional screening)? How many persons on watchlists are
American citizens or lawful permanent residents? How many people are
watchlisted by mistake or because their names are similar to those of suspected
terrorists?" The answers to these questions affect how much process is
constitutionally due to watchlisted individuals. 36
D. The Current Process
While employees adversely affected by government use of watchlists
currently receive some process, travelers are granted none at all. The
government gives transportation-sector workers predeprivation notice of
government actions based on security threat assessments, but the government
has little choice in the matter: Employees need to be told not to come to
work.17 Under the current regulations, some transportation employees
32. IRTPA, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 5 4012(a)(1), 118 Stat. 3638, 3715 (2004) (codified as amended
at49 U.S.C.S. 449o3(j)(2)(C)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2005)).
33. See, e.g., Leslie Miller, TSA Chief Suspends Traveler Registry Plans, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 9,
20o6, available at http://www.breitbart.com/news/2oo6/o2og/D8FLMBT8.html (noting
that TSA's director told Congress in February 2006 that it was putting the Secure Flight
program on hold due to security concerns).
34- Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 31.
35. See, for example, recent news stories about babies who have been placed on the watchlist.
E.g., Kristie Rieken, 4-Year-Old Boy on Government 'No-Fly'List, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 5, 2006,
available at http://www.sfgate.con-/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2oo6/ol/oS/
national/a111845S48.DTL; see also Caroline Drees, US No-Fly List Vexes Travelers from Babies
on up, REUTERS, Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://today.reuters.com/business/newsarticle.
aspx?type=tnBusinessNews&storyD=nN42841o7. A woman named Sarah Zapolsky
reported that she was told that her nine-month-old son was on the No Fly List when she
checked in for a flight to Italy. She said she was initially amused, but when she "'found out
you can't actually get off the list, [she] started to get a bit annoyed.'" Id.
36. For example, see infra note 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of distinctions
between the process due to citizens and aliens.
37. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115-.117 (2005) (airmen certificates); id. § 15 7 2.14 1(d)( 3 ) (HMEs). While
employees are given notice that they are on a watchlist, they are not told why.
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adversely affected by the use of watchlists receive a minimal appeals process.
For example, citizen pilots are statutorily entitled to an on-the-record hearing
under the Administrative Procedure Act.3s Other types of transportation
workers, 39 and noncitizen pilots, receive only the opportunity to offer a written
challenge through an ex parte exchange of documents. Even those given an
opportunity to challenge their status are not informed of the basis for their
being on the lists in the first place.40
In contrast to employees, the government need not practically-and
therefore does not -tell travelers in advance that they have been placed on the
No Fly List. Sometimes, passengers are informed that they are on a security list
when they arrive at an airport.41 Other times, passengers are detained at the
ticket counter but not told why. For example, Senator Kennedy recalled an
airline agent saying to him: "We can't give [the ticket] to you, you can't buy a
ticket." After Kennedy asked why not, the agent responded simply, "We can't
tell you.
42
Once informed of their status, watchlisted travelers have no opportunity
for a hearing. TSA provides a clearance process - in the form of a paper identity
verification form- only if a person is watchlisted because he has a name similar
to that of a suspected terrorist. Once the individual gets the form from the
agency, he can then display it at airports to be permitted to fly. The Agency's
38. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2000).
39. The HME regulation provides the individual with an opportunity for a written appeal only,
with no access to the secret evidence used and no ability to appear in person or call or cross-
examine witnesses. 49 C.F.R. § 1572.141 (2005). The port and maritime statute, however,
requires the government to "establish an appeals process under this section for individuals
found to be ineligible for a transportation security card that includes notice and an
opportunity for a hearing." 46 U.S.C.S. § 70105(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2005). No such process
has been created yet.
40. The paper hearing process for nonresident aliens has been upheld by the D.C. Circuit. J/fry
v. FAA, 37o F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004), upheld a procedure under which nonresident alien
pilots did not receive any of the classified information used as a factual basis for the
revocation of their certificates. As the j/fiy court noted, the key factor was that the pilots
were nonresident aliens who worked outside of the United States. Id. at 1182-83. Several
unions representing aviation workers also challenged the regulations TSA had promulgated
for American citizens. The D.C. Circuit considered those claims in Coalition of Airline Pilots
Ass'n v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and held the challenge moot because Congress
had passed a statute requiring new regulations, and TSA had ceased to apply the existing
regulations in the interim.
41. See Complaint at 6, Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(No. Co4-763Z), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/aclu/greenvtsa4o6o4cmp.
pdf.
4z. Swarns, supra note 1.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:2148 20o6
MAKING THE NO FLY LIST FLY
procedures specifically provide that the process "will not remove a name" from
the watchlist, but only "distinguish[] passengers" with similar names from
persons who are in fact on the list.43 TSA has stated that the Secure Flight
program "will help eliminate most of the false alerts caused by the current out-
dated system" and will "include a redress mechanism through which people
can resolve questions if they believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly
selected for additional screening."' TSA has not announced, however, what
form that mechanism will take.
II. PRIVATE INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The use of government watchlists for transportation security deprives
individuals of liberty and property interests protected by the Constitution's
Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has refused to define precisely what
counts as "liberty" or "property" under the Constitution, noting only that these
concepts are broad and expansive. 4' Nonetheless, the Court has identified a
number of specific interests protected by the Due Process Clause, 46 three of
which are directly affected by watchlist programs: the liberty to travel; the
liberty to pursue an occupation and the property right in a government-issued
license or certificate; and the liberty to maintaining one's reputation in the
community.
43. TSA Watch Lists Clearance Procedures, supra note 25.
44. Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 31.
45. With respect to property rights, "the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden
distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of
procedural due process rights." Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
(1972). The Court defined liberty similarly:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be
no doubt that the meaning of liberty must be broad indeed.
Id. at 571-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to "persons," and not
just citizens, Congress and the courts have authorized and upheld different standards of
process for citizens and noncitizens. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-8o (1976); see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). As such, the remainder of
this Note focuses on U.S. citizens. While as a matter of fairness and policy I believe that
Congress should grant the liberties and protections I propose to noncitizens -or at least to
lawful permanent residents - I do not argue that it is constitutionally required to do so.
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A. Liberty To Travel
The Constitution has long protected the right of individuals to travel
between states. As a nineteenth-century Supreme Court case explained: "We
are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own States." 47 Although the Articles of
Confederation provided that "the people of each state shall have free ingress
and regress to and from any other state, ' no single clause of the Constitution
explicitly guarantees the right to interstate travel. The Court has suggested that
"a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created"49 and has located
the fundamental right to travel in textual provisions including the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Commerce Clause, and extratextual
concepts like the "federal structure of government adopted by our
Constitution.""0
As the Court has explained, the constitutional right to travel includes the
right "to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce
in doing so,""' and to be "uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." 2 Although the Court's recent
cases in this area have concerned questions about whether states can condition
certain benefits on residency requirements, 3 restrictions on air travel -such as
47. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (Miller, J.) (striking down a Nevada
statute that taxed people who traveled out of the state).
48. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1789 art. IV.
49. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
so. Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (holding that the right to travel protects (1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter
and to leave another state, (2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second state, and (3) for those travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
state); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that restricting welfare benefits
to new residents of a state violates the fundamental right to travel). For further analysis of
the development of the fundamental rights prong of the Equal Protection Clause with
respect to the right to travel, see Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the Right To
Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1572-75
(1989).
si. Guest, 383 U.S. at 757.
52. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499.
53. In contrast to the Shapiro and Saenz line of cases, earlier right-to-travel cases did consider
more direct barriers to interstate travel. See Wildenthal, supra note 50, at 1569 (noting that
216o Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:2148 20o6
MAKING THE NO FLY LIST FLY
the watchlist program- directly threaten this right. The Court has yet to decide
whether a restriction on a particular mode of travel violates this fundamental
right and is subject to strict scrutiny, but a ban on flight might.5 4 An individual
residing in Alaska, Hawaii, or even California would have a difficult time
reaching the East Coast without air travel. And in the mobile society of the
twenty-first century, air travel is critical in order to hold many high-paying
professional jobs and even to keep in touch with one's family members. As
Justice Douglas wrote in one right-to-travel case, "Travel
... may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.""5
Whatever the precise dimensions of the fundamental right to travel, the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the ability to travel by
airplane. Restriction on movement is the very definition of a deprivation of
liberty. As the Court has stated, "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law." 6 By
analogy, even though there may not be a fundamental right to drive, a state
cannot revoke a driver's license without due process . 7 Another analogy can be
made to the Court's precedents on restrictions on international travel.
Although the Court has explicitly distinguished the fundamental right to
interstate travel from the liberty to travel abroad that is protected only by the
in these cases the court considered whether a state could "place a direct and tangible obstacle
in the path of interstate migration").
S4. Some lower federal courts have held that the fundamental right to travel does not include
the right to use any particular mode of transportation. E.g., Gilmore v. Ashcroft, No. C-o2-
344 4-SI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4869, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2004), affd sub nom.
Gilmore v. Gonzales, No. CV-o2-o3444-SI (9 th Cir. Jan. 26, 2006). The Ninth Circuit held
that there is no fundamental right to fly, but qualified this by stating that "the identification
policy's 'burden' is not unreasonable" because one could still fly without identification by
agreeing to additional screening. Gilmore, slip op. at 1155; see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d
12o2, 12o6 (9 th Cir. 1999) (stating that there is no fundamental right to drive). Others have
suggested that comprehensive restrictions, such as banning passengers from flying to a
particular airport, may be susceptible to constitutional challenge. E.g., City of Houston v.
FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1192 (5th Cir. 1982) ("No one has ever attempted completely to bar
travelers from distant cities from flying to National Airport. Such an attempt might well
give rise to a constitutional claim."). The Supreme Court has yet to comment on this issue.
55. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Regan v. Wald, 468
U.S. 222 (1984).
56. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125 (noting that this "right was emerging at least as early as the Magna
Carta" and stating that "[fl reedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values").
57. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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Due Process Clause, ss it has held that this liberty can only be restricted without
process if it is an across-the-board ban, not one that targets specific
individuals. s9 To restrict the freedom to fly on a case-by-case basis, the
government must provide due process.
B. Employment as Liberty and Property
Just as travelers enjoy a constitutionally protected liberty to travel without
undue government restriction, transportation-sector employees have a
constitutional liberty to pursue the occupation of their choice. Courts have long
characterized the ability to pursue a trade or profession as part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.6 ° In different cases, the Supreme Court
has given lawyers, teachers, and members of other professions due process
protection to "'engage in any of the common occupations of life. ' ' 6 , Many
transportation-sector employees covered by watchlists should find their liberty
to pursue common occupations similarly protected. Although some-for
58. E.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) ("[T]hefreedom to travel outside the UnitedStates must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United States.").
sq. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Court held that the Subversive Activities Control Act,
which made it illegal for members of the Communist Party to apply for or use a passport,
"too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the
liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964). The Court held that
this sort of blanket deprivation violated the Due Process Clause. The denial of passports
needed to be based on specific information about the individual's knowledge, activity,
commitment to the association, and a consideration of the purposes for which an individual
wished to travel. Two subsequent cases-Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), and Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) -clarified and refined the Court's doctrine. The Zemel Court
carefully distinguished that case from earlier precedents on the ground that the government
"has refused to validate appellant's passport not because of any characteristic peculiar to
appellant, but rather because of foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." Zemel,
381 U.S. at 13. In Regan, the Court upheld a ban on travel to Cuba because the government
"made no effort selectively to deny passports on the basis of political belief or affiliation, but
simply imposed a general ban on travel to Cuba following the break in diplomatic and
consular relations with that country in 1961." Regan, 468 U.S. at 241. The across-the-board
restriction on travel, applied to all persons, thus alleviated the concerns raised by the
selective application of the ban in Aptheker. Because it is applied selectively, the No Fly List
presents a situation more akin to Aptheker than Zemel or Regan. As in Aptheker, the
government has not blocked all travel, only the travel of certain persons.
60. Truax v. Raich held that "the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." 239 U.S. 33,41 (1915). That holding has
been echoed more recently in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.23 (1976).
61. Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
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example, waiters at restaurants inside the secured areas of airports -would be
able to find similar employment elsewhere if denied the ability to continue
employment at their present jobs, many others -including pilots, commercial
truck drivers, or others who have specific skills -would have a valid claim that
losing their employment as a result of a watchlist prohibits them from
pursuing their occupation of choice and entitles them to due process.
Courts also consider government-issued licenses to be property interests
protected by the Due Process Clause. In the air travel context, courts have
specifically held that an employee has a property interest in an FAA-issued
pilot's certificate.62 So too with driver's licenses.6 3 The denial of an HME for a
commercial driver's license-the possession of which subjects the holder to
watchlist-based security measures - may not affect one's ability to earn a living
to the same extent that denial of the license itself would. However, without an
HME, individuals are often unable to gain or maintain employment with
trucking companies and thus lose the ability to practice the occupation of their
choice.6 4 Under the Court's due process precedents, persons who stand to have
a government-issued license or certificate revoked or denied based on a threat
assessment are entitled to procedural due process to challenge the threatened
revocation or denial.
C. Stigma, or Reputation in the Community
Courts have held that a person must receive due process before the
government takes an action that damages his standing in the community or
places a stigma on him. For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau the Court
struck down a statute that permitted a city's chief of police to distribute a
62. See Pastrana v. United States, 746 F.2d 1447, 145o (1ith Cir. 1984) (holding that a holder of
an FAA-issued pilot certificate has a cognizable property interest and is entitled to due
process). Courts regularly require due process for FAA suspensions or revocations of pilots'
licenses based on safety issues. See, e.g., George S. Petkoff, Recent Developments in Aviation
Law, 63 J. AiRL. &CoM. 67, 121-30 (1997) (cataloguing FAA certificate cases).
63. The Court in Dixon v. Love held that "[i] t is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the
deprivation of a driver's license by the State." 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). Similarly, in Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), the Court stated that the "[s]uspension of issued licenses
... involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees" and that the
"licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required." See also
Aurelio v. R.I. Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 985 F. Supp. 48, 56-59 (D.R.I.
1997) ("A driver's license is a significant and considerable private interest, impacting one's
ability to earn a living and enjoy the liberty of travel, among other things.").
64. Due to the structure of the commercial trucking industry, employers often require all drivers
to hold an HME so that they may drive any truck in the fleet.
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notice to all retail liquor outlets stating that certain listed persons were not to
be sold liquor due to their previous "excessive drinking. ''6 ' The Court held that
a person was entitled to due process before being placed on such a list:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential. "Posting" under the Wisconsin
Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma,
an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading one. Under
the Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no process at all....
Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an
unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be
prevented.66
Even though the government does not actively broadcast the No Fly List to
the larger community, the liberty interest identified in Constantineau is still
implicated. First, according to the complaint in a lawsuit against TSA,
passengers "are sometimes informed, in full view of others waiting in line, that
their names are on a federal security list. This results in significant
embarrassment and humiliation to the passenger, as fellow passengers and the
traveling public subsequently regard the innocent passenger with suspicion or
fear."67 The stigma attached to an individual who is thought of as a potential
terrorist is, needless to say, extremely high. Second, the No Fly List satisfies the
65. 400 U.S. 433, 434 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Vitek v. Jones, Justice White
wrote of committing an individual to a mental hospital:
The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of
freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental
hospital "can engender adverse social consequences to the individual" and that
"[w]hether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or choose to call it something else
... we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on
the individual."
445 U.S. 480,492 (198o) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979); Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979)). The Court's government-employment cases comment on
the effect of loss of employment on an individual's reputation, and, in turn, the effect of a
damaged reputation on an individual's ability to gain future employment. See, e.g., Roth, 408
U.S. at 574 & n.13.
66. 400 U.S. at 437. More recently, Justice Stevens has applied similar reasoning in requiring
due process for persons on Sex Offender Registration lists: "The statutes impose significant
affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply.... In my
judgment, these statutes unquestionably affect a constitutionally protected interest in
liberty." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,111-12 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Complaint, supra note 41, at 6.
,IAA Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:2148 20o6
MAKING THE NO FLY LIST FLY
limitation added by Paul v. Davis that the government imposition of a stigma
be accompanied by some other government action to trigger due process
protection.68 In Constantineau, this consisted of the legal inhibition against
buying alcohol; 6, for persons affected by security watchlists, the inability to fly
constitutes the additional government action; and for transportation
employees, it is the dismissal from employment.
III. PROTECTING SECURITY AND LIBERTY: A MODEL PROCESS
The preceding Part has argued that individuals prevented from flying or
deprived of transportation-sector careers because they have been placed on a
security watchlist have a constitutional right to due process to challenge these
government actions. This Part proposes a model process-guided by the
Court's jurisprudence and procedures that Congress has created in analogous
national security situations -that would effectively protect both the individual
and government interests at stake. Commentators and courts generally
consider due process to have two main elements: adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. This Part considers them in turn. In
Section A, I suggest allowing individuals to get advance, in-person notice at
airports of whether they are on a watchlist. In Section B, I propose a
"compensatory counsel" program that would allow individuals a fair hearing
and reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty, while still respecting
the government's interest in protecting classified evidence.
The Supreme Court has invited, indeed required, this sort of tailoring. The
Court has repeatedly insisted that the requirements of due process are flexible
and must be tailored to particular circumstances. 7 1 In recognition of this
flexibility, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge articulated a three-pronged
balancing test for determining what process is due in an administrative
68. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that the circulation of handbills to merchants
describing an individual as a shoplifter was not a deprivation of liberty absent additional
government action).
69. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434.
70. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this Court and
others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.... Its flexibility is in its scope
once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.").
Elsewhere, the Court has stated that due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union,
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2165
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
hearing,71 which it has recently reaffirmed and applied in the terrorism
context.72 The three considerations to be balanced are,
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
73
The first two Parts of this Note, on the government's security interest in
using watchlists, and the private interests affected by them, correspond to the
third and first prongs of the Mathews test respectively. This Part will focus on
the second prong: the risk of erroneous deprivation of these private interests
and the value of other procedural safeguards. But it is not so simple. The
process I propose implicates additional interests at the notice and hearing levels
for private individuals and the government, beyond the security effectiveness
of the watchlists generally and the deprivation of the individual's liberty and
property. I discuss these in the following Sections.
A. Advance Airport Notice
Due process generally requires that a person be given notice of an
impending government deprivation of his liberty or property.74 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action."7" Only by receiving such notice-usually in
71. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
72. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
73. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
74. This Section applies only to travelers. Transportation-sector employees who are deprived of
their jobs because their names are on a watchlist are currently given written notice of their
status. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The following Section, proposing a
hearing procedure, applies to both travelers and employees.
75. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). For a more recent
statement of due process notice requirements, see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161
(2002) (affirming the "reasonably calculated" holding from Mullane).
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writing -does an individual who has been watchlisted have the opportunity to
prevent the mistaken deprivation of his liberty interests.
But there's a catch. The government argues that advance notice would
allow terrorists to evade detection. Under the current system, a law
enforcement officer is alerted when individuals on the No Fly List arrive at the
ticket counter for their flight.76 The government presumes that watchlisted
individuals pose security threats, and it does not want them to avoid
encounters with law enforcement by granting them advance notice of their
status. If given advance notice in writing, individuals on the No Fly List could
fly under fictitious identities to avoid questioning and evade capture.
77
To escape this quagmire, I propose that the government create a system by
which an individual could go in person to any airport at any time during
normal business hours to inquire whether he is on the No Fly List. Three
possible fates would greet him. (1) In all likelihood, he would be cleared and
would have the peace of mind of knowing that he would not be held up on his
next trip to the airport.78 (2) If the individual were on the list, law enforcement
officers could perform a Terry stop and question the individual.79 If there were
probable cause to do so, officials could then arrest and detain the individual.
Once detained, the individual would be entitled to the due process protections
provided to any arrestee"s (3) If the traveler were told that he was on the list,
but not detained, he would be able to challenge his status. While the
government would not necessarily be required to provide a hearing before the
individual's next flight,"' the individual should receive speedy process.s2 The
76. See Complaint, supra note 41, at 6.
77. If biometric technology were in place to prevent travelers from assuming false names, the
government could grant advance notice by mail because individuals could not evade
detection. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of this technology in
the context of the Registered Traveler program and TWIC.
78. The program thus shares the benefits of TSA's Registered Traveler program. See supra note
12 and accompanying text.
79. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8o. Even Jose Padilla, the American citizen detained in O'Hare Airport and originally held by
the government with no process, has eventually found his way to the protections of the
criminal justice system. Although the process due to a detained American is beyond the
scope of this Note, the compensatory counsel hearing process proposed below could offer
one model. See infra Section III.B; see also Peter H. Schuck, Editorial, Terrorism Cases
Demand New Hybrid Courts, L.A. TimEs, July 9, 2004, at B13 (proposing a new model of
process for enemy combatant cases).
81. The Supreme Court has stated that a hearing may be delayed until after deprivation in
"emergency situations," Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 546, 570 n.7 (1972)
(citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)), or in "extraordinary situations where some
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government, for example, could guarantee a resolution of the matter in
advance of a person's next scheduled flight for those persons who used the
notice procedure sufficiently in advance of that flight. While it might not
entirely eliminate the possibility of an individual being unfairly prevented from
traveling, the advance notice mechanism would substantially reduce the
likelihood of unfair deprivation.
In other national security cases, federal courts have allowed the government
to withhold advance notice of deprivations, either altogether or by obtaining
prior judicial approval. For example, courts have upheld a procedure of the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) by which
financial assets of potential terrorists are blocked or seized without prior
notice.8 In another context, the D.C. Circuit has authorized the State
Department to postpone notice of placement of organizations on a list of
foreign terrorist groups if the government receives prior judicial approval.
While holding that the Secretary of State "must afford to the entities under
consideration notice that the designation is impending," the circuit court added
that "[u]pon an adequate showing to the court, the Secretary may provide this
valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing," Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). Courts have upheld post-deprivation process when
the government interest is far weaker than preventing terrorist attacks, reasoning that when
"a State must act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation
process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause."
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997). An example is Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114
(1997), which upheld a post-deprivation process for driver's license revocations because of
"the important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt
removal of a safety hazard."
82. Courts have found that the Constitution requires speedy process in various contexts. In a
case about a license suspension, the Court held that the respondent needed to "be assured a
prompt postsuspension hearing, one that would proceed and be concluded without
appreciable delay" because the consequences of a brief suspension could be dramatic. Barry
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)
(holding that the opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time"). In the
criminal context, the Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be brought to trial within
seventy days of either the defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer or the filing of
the indictment, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2000).
83. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002)
("[T]he Government must satisfy the following requirements: (i) the deprivation was
necessary to secure an important governmental interest; (2) there has been a special need for
very prompt action; and (3) the party initiating the deprivation was a government official
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was
necessary and justified in the particular instance." (citations omitted)). The district court
found that the OFAC designation and blocking order satisfied all three of these
requirements. Id. at 78. The OFAC appeals procedure is contained in 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.8o6-
.807 (2005), and the statutory authorization in 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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notice after the designation where earlier notification would impinge upon the
security and other foreign policy goals of the United States.
8,
While these practices demonstrate that flexible approaches to notice are
constitutionally appropriate, neither offers a perfect model for the
transportation watchlists. Given the vast size of the watchlists, it would be
impractical for the government to go through a preemptive judicial proceeding
about whether notice should be given to each person on the No Fly List.
Moreover, there are significant differences between these two situations and
the No Fly List. First, these notice-postponing practices apply to foreign assets
and organizations, not to American citizens and other persons inside the
United States. Second, the seizure of assets can be fully compensated if later
found to be wrongful. If an individual is held up at the airport and denied the
freedom to travel, however, any ex post compensation will invariably be
inadequate. Thus, both practically and legally, the OFAC and State
Department notice models do not translate well to the No Fly context.
In contrast, the advance airport notice system not only works well in the
transportation security context, it also satisfies the Mathews balancing test.
First, it protects the individual's interest in not being detained from catching a
flight at the last minute. Second, it reduces the risk of erroneous deprivation of
an innocent individual's right to fly; under the existing system, nobody can be
certain they will not be stopped on their next trip to the airport. Third, the
system would place only a modest administrative burden on the government.
All airports currently have the capacity to identify and detain persons on the
No Fly List, so this would not create additional costs or bureaucracies. And, the
system might even enhance security by bringing potentially suspicious persons
in for further investigation.
B. Compensatory Counsel
What type of hearing should be provided to travelers who are kept from
flying, or transportation employees who are kept from working? In typical
administrative adjudications -whether governed by statute (generally the
Administrative Procedure Act) or by the constitutional requirements of the Due
Process Clause -individuals receive an in-person, trial-type hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker during which they may challenge the government's
84. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
85. Some might argue that terrorists could find out that they are not on the list and thus would
have access to transportation infrastructure. However, if the terrorist is not on the watchlist,
then the watchlist system would not work in the first place.
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evidence and cross-examine its witnesses. This trial-type adversarial process
gives the individual the greatest chance to make his case.
In the context of transportation watchlists, there's once again a hitch. The
watchlists are overwhelmingly based on secret information gathered by
confidential sources,8 6 and the government is understandably hesitant to
disclose this information to people it considers to be potential terrorists. Yet
without knowledge of why they have been placed on a watchlist, individuals
will not be able to present a meaningful challenge.
I propose a way around this Catch-22. In exchange for using secret evidence
to which the individual will not have access, the government should provide
individuals with the next best thing to the information itself: a government-
compensated attorney who holds a security clearance and may view and
challenge classified evidence on behalf of his client. These "compensatory
counsels" would undergo the necessary background checks, and receive top-
level security clearances from the government. As in other administrative
proceedings, the client could also retain his own attorney, although the private
attorney would not have access to classified or sensitive information. The
compensatory counsel would be able to consult with his client and review
government evidence in advance of the hearing itself. The counsel would then
assist the individual in presenting his case at the hearing. The portion of the
hearing dealing with any classified or sensitive security information would be
conducted before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in camera in a secure
location. In that closed portion of the hearing, the compensatory counsel could
raise challenges to the secret government evidence and cross-examine any
witnesses relevant to the government's case. These compensatory counsels
would be bound on the one hand by professional rules of responsibility to
vigorously represent their clients, and on the other hand by the legal
requirements of holding a security clearance to keep confidential the
information to which they are given access.
The Court has explicitly applied the Mathews test to determining whether
individuals have a right to counsel in administrative hearings. In Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, the Court held that "as a litigant's interest in
personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel."8  For
86. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
87. 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981); id. at 31 ("The dispositive question, which must now be addressed, is
whether the three Eldridge factors, when weighed against the presumption that there is no
right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical
liberty, suffice to rebut that presumption and thus to lead to the conclusion that the Due
Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel when a State seeks to terminate an
indigent's parental status.").
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watchlist-based security threat assessments, the liberty and property interests
may not be as weighty as they would be in criminal cases"8 or when the
government seeks to commit an individual to a mental hospital.8 In those
cases, the Court has found that due process guarantees access to counsel. Yet
even if the deprivation of liberty is not as serious in the watchlist cases as in
these confinement cases, the use of secret evidence mandates the compensatory
counsel system to reduce the "risk of erroneous deprivation."
The remainder of this Section applies the three prongs of the Mathews test
on a micro-scale to the hearing process itself, while drawing analogies to
legislatively and judicially designed procedures used in related cases. First, it
shows that the compensatory counsel system substantially protects the
government interest in safeguarding information. Then, it considers the
private interest in knowing the evidence that has resulted in an individual
being placed on the watchlist. Finally, it argues that granting the individual a
government-employed attorney with access to classified information strikes an
effective balance that would significantly reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation of liberty and property. In sum, the solution satisfies both the
spirit and the letter of the Mathews test.
1. The Government Interest in Protecting Information
In addition to its overwhelming interest in protecting transportation
infrastructure and other passengers from terrorist attacks, the government has
a strong interest in protecting classified information and the confidential
sources used to gather counterterrorism intelligence. The government is not
legally authorized to share classified information with individuals lacking
security clearances; criminal and civil penalties protect against such
disclosure,9" as do TSA's regulations.91 Revealing secret evidence during a
watchlist hearing could, at best, make intelligence collecting methods and
personnel less effective by allowing terrorists to evade them; at worst, it could
88. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that government must provide free
counsel to indigent criminal defendants).
89. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (requiring access to counsel for persons facing
involuntary transfers to mental institutions).
go. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000) (covering classified information identifying covert agents).
gi. See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 1520 (2005) (covering sensitive security information).
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reveal gaps in the government's ability to collect information and put
intelligence personnel at risk.
92
The government's significant security interest does not end the Mathews
balancing test, but it does provide a justification for novel departures from
standard procedures. The Court's opinion in Department of the Navy v. Egan
reflects the deference the Court has given to the government's desire to protect
security-related information in administrative hearings. In that case, the Court
considered what process is due when government employees' security
clearances are denied or revoked. The Court gave agencies broad discretion to
make security clearance decisions for their employees. 93 As the Court
explained:
Certainly, it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to
review the substance of such a judgment and to decide whether the
agency should have been able to make the necessary affirmative
prediction with confidence. Nor can such a body determine what
constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential
risk.
94
Following this ruling, agencies have devised specially tailored hearing
processes for reviewing adverse decisions on employees' security clearances,
decisions which are at times based on classified information that the affected
employee is not allowed to view-a situation similar to watchlisted travelers
and employees. The Defense Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals, for
example, administers hearings in government security clearance cases for
contractor personnel working for the Department of Defense and twenty other
departments and agencies.9" This process provides an in-person hearing during
which the individual is given "as comprehensive and detailed a summary of the
92. Finally, the government has a third relatively simple interest: the administrative cost of the
hearing process itself. The actual administrative cost of these hearings-which would
include the salary and overhead of the compensatory counsels, as well as the cost of
conducting the hearings themselves -is difficult to estimate, because the government does
not reveal the exact number of persons affected by terrorist watchlists. Forcing the
government to pay the cost of these attorneys could create incentives not to place persons on
watchlists without sufficient justification, which could reduce the overall administrative cost
of this type of security and help the counsels pay for themselves.
93. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
g4. Id.
95. Dep't of Defense, Directive No. 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992) (implementing Exec. Order No.
lO,865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (Feb. 20, 196o)), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/
doha/directive.html.
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information as the national security permits," but no access to the actual secret
evidence. 6 To compensate for this evidentiary handicap, the hearing officer is
directed to give "appropriate consideration to the fact that the applicant did not
have an opportunity to confront such evidence" and the head of the agency or
department must personally review the case when secret evidence is used.
97
Similarly, the Department of Energy's Office of Hearings and Appeals
conducts hearings for individuals who wish to appeal security clearance denials
and revocations. 98 As in the Defense Department, the hearing officer is
instructed that "[a]ppropriate consideration shall be accorded to the fact that
the individual did not have an opportunity to cross-examine" confidential
witnesses. 99 As these procedures reveal, the government can tailor hearing
practices to protect national security information.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld offers a
recent example of the Supreme Court's flexible approach to hearing procedures
in national security cases. There, the Court recommended special
proceedings - "tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict"'00 - for Americans detained as
enemy combatants. Following Mathews, the Court proposed specific alterations
that would "sufficiently address the 'risk of an erroneous deprivation' of a
detainee's liberty interest" without unduly burdening the government.'
While the burden of proof in administrative proceedings is generally placed on
the party that is the proponent of the order being adjudicated,"°2 the Hamdi
Court proposed an alternative:
[T]he Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of
the government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus,
once the government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas
petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to
the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that
he falls outside the criteria. A burden-shifting scheme of this sort would
meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist,
96. Id. § E3.1.23.
97. Id.
98. See 1o C.F.R. §§ 710.20 to .36 (2005).
99. Id. § 710.26(m)(2).
1o0. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
ioi. Id. at 534.
102. 5 U.S.C. S 556(d) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule
or order has the burden of proof.").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due
regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningfiul support for its
conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant."0 3
Providing individuals adversely affected by government watchlists with
compensatory counsel is precisely the kind of procedural accommodation of the
government's national security interest endorsed by the Court in Egan and
Hamdi. The compensatory counsel system would not burden the government's
interest in protecting secret information. First, the government itself would
select and hire these attorneys, evaluate them for the security clearances
necessary to access the secret information, and train them on matters of
information security. Second, these attorneys would be governed by the same
laws concerning treatment and handling of classified and sensitive information
as other officials. They would be subject to civil and criminal penalties -just
like any other government employee or holder of a security clearance -for any
violation of the laws pertaining to these types of information. Third, a wall
would exist between the attorneys and their clients. The compensatory
counsels would be prohibited from sharing any secret evidence with their
clients, or even from giving information to their clients that might reveal the
nature or source of the secret evidence. As a result, this system would allow the
government to protect classified information and confidential sources.
2. The Private Interest in Access to Evidence
The compensatory counsel system would also give individuals a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. A fair hearing requires that an individual
know the evidence being used against him. For criminal defendants, this aspect
of fundamental fairness is anchored in the Constitution's Sixth Amendment
guarantee that the accused shall have the right "to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation."" 4 This Clause has an obvious rationale, one that
applies with equal force in the watchlist context: An individual cannot present
a credible defense without knowing what charges he is refuting and what
evidence the government has against him.
The individual's need for access to evidence is no less in the administrative
context. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Court explained that
1o3. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
1o4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Although the text of the Fifth Amendment does not contain all of
the protections guaranteed by the Sixth, the Court has required disclosure of evidence to
affected parties to satisfy due process in administrative proceedings. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text.
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the opportunity to be heard required by the Due Process Clause includes
written notice of the charges against the individual as well as an explanation of
the government's evidence."I The Court has not shied away from applying this
requirement to evidence used in administrative proceedings related to national
security. In Greene v. McElroy, for example, an employee of a defense contractor
had his security clearance revoked based on secret testimony concerning his ex-
wife's communist associations. In finding that the employee had been denied
due process to challenge this revocation, the Court explained that American
jurisprudence included certain "relatively immutable" principles, and that
"[o]ne of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the
evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. ,io6
Just as the Court in Hamdi and Egan authorized deviations from usual
procedures to protect government security interests, Congress has also
innovated to secure due process in cases involving secret evidence and
information. Congress has created a statutory framework for regulating the use
of classified information in Article III criminal trials through the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA). '7 Under CIPA, "upon a sufficient
showing" a court may authorize the government to "delete specified items of
classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant
through discovery" and may substitute "a summary of the information for such
classified documents" or "a statement admitting relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to prove. '  The government may further
105. 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) ("The essential requirements of due process, and all that
respondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity to
respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed
action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. The tenured public
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of
the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." (citation
omitted)).
1o6. 36o U.S. 474,496 (1959).
107. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2000). For scholarly commentary on CIPA, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277 (1986);
David I. Greenberger, Note, An Overview of the Ethical Implications of the Classified
Information Procedures Act, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 151 (1998); and Richard P. Salgado,
Note, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE
L.J. 427, 427-428 (1988). Every court that has considered the process has held that CIPA
does not violate criminal defendants' due process rights. See Timothy J. Shea, Note, CIPA
Under Siege: The Use and Abuse of Classified Information in Criminal Trials, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 657, 669-76 (199o).
1o8. 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (2000).
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"request the court to conduct a hearing to make all determinations concerning
the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that would
otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceeding."" 9 The court may, at
this hearing, decide to disclose information, or may authorize the substitution
of a summary, or of a statement admitting relevant facts, "if it finds that the
statement or summary will provide the defendant with substantially the same
ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified
information."" 0 The government may submit an affidavit, to be considered in
camera and ex parte, "certifying that disclosure of classified information would
cause identifiable damage to the national security of the United States, and
explaining the basis for the classification of such information. 111 Once the
district court determines that an item of classified information is relevant and
material, it must be admitted unless the government provides an adequate
substitute. The statute proposes a harsh default penalty to the government for
failing to disclose information -either dismissal of the indictment or exclusion
of the evidence-while giving judges the opportunity to modify these sanctions
when appropriate." 2
While CIPA itself does not apply to watchlisted individuals challenging
their status in administrative hearings, the principles it stands for need not be
limited to the letter of the statute. The Fourth Circuit, for example, has used
these- provisions for guidance in the case of alleged terrorist Zacarias
Moussaoui, even though CIPA does not apply direcdy to his case." 3 Moussaoui
requested that persons being detained as enemy combatants, including 9/11
mastermind Ramzi Binalshibh, be allowed to testify as part of his defense. The
government refused access to the enemy combatants, citing national security
concerns. The Fourth Circuit used the statute as a model for resolving the
iog. Id. S 6(a).
1,o. Id. 6(c)(1).
mii. Id. 6(c)(2).
112. Id. § 6(e)(2) ("Whenever a defendant is prevented ... from ... causing the disclosure of
classified information, the court shall dismiss the indictment or information; except that,
when the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by dismissal of
the indictment or information, the court shall order such other action, in lieu of dismissing
the indictment or information, as the court determines is appropriate.").
113. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui IMl), 382 F.3d 453, 472 n.20 (4 th Cir. 2004) ("We
adhere to our prior ruling that CIPA does not apply because the January 30 and August 29
orders of the district court are not covered by either of the potentially relevant provisions of
CIPA: § 4 (concerning deletion of classified information from documents to be turned over to
the defendant during discovery) or § 6 (concerning the disclosure of classified information
by the defense during pretrial or trial proceedings)."); see also United States v. Moussaoui
(Moussaoui I), 333 F. 3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003).
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tensions between the national security interest and the individual's interest in
obtaining evidence for trial. As the court stated, "Congress' judgment,
expressed in CIPA, [is] that the Executive's interest in protecting classified
information does not overcome a defendant's right to present his case."
1" 4
Following a Supreme Court precedent that, if the evidence "is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the [government's] privilege [in classified information] must give
way," ' s the Fourth Circuit looked to CIPA for guidance." 6 The panel explained
that CIPA "enjoins district courts to seek a solution that neither disadvantages
the defendant nor penalizes the government (and the public) for protecting
classified information that may be vital to national security," because it gives
judges discretion to impose a lesser sanction than dismissal of the indictment
on the government if appropriate substitutions are available or are in "the
interests of justice."" 7 In Moussaoui, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
"appropriate substitutions [were] available" for the testimony of the enemy
combatants, and so the indictment was not dismissed."' Even though the exact
terms of CIPA did not apply, the court recognized that the congressional intent
to create a fair trial included providing the individual with access to all
information "relevant and helpful" to his defense. So too, individuals kept from
working or traveling by the government should have access to the information
they need to present a case.
Like CIPA, the compensatory counsel model would effectively protect the
individual's interest in a fair hearing. The proposal assumes that the
government-provided counsel would zealously advocate for his third-party
client. There are several reasons to believe that he would do so. First, the job is
likely to attract attorneys who believe in the cause of defending civil liberties.
In this sense, the counsels might mirror the pool of public defenders -people
who are paid by the government to argue against the government. Second,
these compensatory counsels would have, as all lawyers do, a professional
responsibility to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients. Third, strict civil
service protections would guard the attorneys' independence. Like ALJs, they
would be hired, regulated, and removed by the Office of Personnel
Management, not by DHS. Finally, to the extent feasible, watchlisted
individuals could select their counsel from among the pool available.
114. United States v. Moussaoui (Moussaoui II), 365 F.3d 29 2, 312 (4 th Cir. 2004).
115. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 6o-61 (1957).
116. Moussaoui III, 382 F.3 d at 471-72.
117. Id. at 477.
118. Moussaoui II, 365 F.3 d at 313.
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3. An Effective Balance
The compensatory counsel hearing model would reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation of individuals' interests in freedom of travel and
employment. If the government has placed an individual on a watchlist
through a case of mistaken identity, the compensatory counsel can discover this
error. If information used to place a person on the watchlist derives from illegal
or unconstitutional sources-for example warrantless searches and seizures or
unauthorized surveillance -the counsel can raise a statutory or constitutional
challenge. The wall in place between the individual on the watchlist and his
government attorney would not prevent effective representation of the
individual's interests. The counsel could be particularly effective in challenging
the government's documentary evidence and cross-examining the
government's witnesses in the closed, in camera portion of the hearing. 9
The compensatory counsel system is particularly appropriate because it
parallels a process with which Congress is already familiar: the Alien Terrorist
Removal Court (ATRC). Congress created the ATRC to review the
deportation of certain lawful permanent resident aliens in cases involving secret
evidence. 2' Using the ATRC, the Attorney General may seek removal of an
individual believed to be a terrorist' based on classified information." The
ATRC is, like other administrative tribunals, a congressionally created Article I
court, albeit one composed of Article III judges. Immigration cases are
administrative proceedings, not criminal trials, so the parallel to persons on
security watchlists is apt. Most appropriately, the ATRC was designed in the
terrorism context to deal with the precise concern that hampers fair process for
persons on security watchlists: the lack of access to classified information.
119. Under the APA, parties are entitled to "conduct such cross-examination" of witnesses
during oral hearings "as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(d) (2000). Professor Tribe has explained that the due process right to a hearing "is
generally found to embrace the right, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."
LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 736 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936)).
12o. Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 in the wake of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401, 11o Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (2000)). The AEDPA includes a variety of provisions, including the
creation of the ATRC. Id.
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000).
izz. The ATRC's definition of "classified information" is borrowed from the CIPA, 8 U.S.C. §
1531(2) (2000).
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The ATRC provisions require the Chief Justice of the United States to
"publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of the United States judicial
circuits who shall constitute a court that shall have jurisdiction to conduct all
removal proceedings." ' The alien terrorist removal procedure also requires
the establishment of a "panel of special attorneys" - similar to the
compensatory counsels I have proposed-each of whom "has a security
clearance which affords the attorney access to classified information"'" and
"has agreed to represent permanent resident aliens with respect to classified
information."' 2 Lawful permanent resident aliens brought before the court
have one of these special attorneys designated to assist them by "reviewing in
camera the classified information" and "challenging through an in camera
proceeding the veracity of the evidence contained in the classified
information." ' 6  Special attorneys are prohibited from disclosing the
information "to the alien or to any other attorney representing the alien" and
those who do make such illegal disclosures are subject to fines and
imprisonment.
2 7
Providing individuals with an attorney who has access to the government's
secret evidence -whether through the ATRC or the compensatory counsel
model I propose - is a particularly appropriate means of satisfying the Mathews
test because it is essentially a balancing mechanism. The general rule in
American law is that parties bear their own attorneys' fees."' Without explicit
statutory authorization, agencies have no authority to pay the attorney's fees or
litigation costs for private parties." 9 Congress, however, may authorize by
statute the award of attorney's fees to private parties. 3° Following the Mathews
123. Id. § 1532(a). The ATRC is modeled after the eleven-member court set up under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, SO U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000), and the Chief
Justice may allow the FISA judges to serve concurrently on the ATRC, 8 U.S.C. S 1532(a)
(2000).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1532(e), (e)(1).
125. Idt. § 1532(e)(2).
126. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(i)(I)-(II).
127. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii)(I)-(II). While the special attorney with access to classified
information is only given to lawful permanent residents, all individuals before the ATRC
have a right to be represented by publicly provided counsel. Id. § 1534(c)(1).
i,8. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
129. See, e.g., Pac. Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1224-27 (4th Cir. 1981); Green County
Planning Bd. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 559 F.2d 1227, 1235 (2d Cir. 1976).
130. The Federal Trade Commission Act, the Equal Access to Justice Act, FOIA, and certain
environmental and civil rights provisions award attorney's fees, generally to parties who
have secured judicial relief against an agency.
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logic, then, the individual sacrifice in not having access to secret evidence is
balanced by the government sacrifice in paying for the individual's attorney.
CONCLUSION
While it is for Congress to implement proper procedures such as those I
have proposed here, courts are not without a role in protecting the
constitutional rights of American travelers and transportation employees.
Decisions by the agency concerning who is listed on the No Fly List or denied a
transportation-sector job should be subject to judicial review in Article III
courts.131 In keeping with the APA, Article III judges should not second-guess
the agency's decisions. The standard of review should be arbitrary and
capricious, not de novo.
1 32
The federal courts should, however, carefully scrutinize the fairness of the
process.133 In particular, judges should review the agency adjudications to
ensure that the compensatory counsels have aggressively advocated for their
clients. In APA-governed administrative hearings, if a person chooses to
represent himself and does not have counsel, the ALJ must take special care to
ensure a fair hearing. 34 A similar rule should apply to these cases: Even though
the individual does have counsel, he does not have the usual full array of
131. To facilitate judicial review, the hearing process should require the administrative judge to
write an opinion stating the basis for his decision. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565
(1974) ("[T]he provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with
possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where
fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly."); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("[T]he decision maker should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, ... though his statement need not
amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.");
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) ("The agency must
make findings that support its decision, and those findings must be supported by
substantial evidence."). But see Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985) (holding that the state
need not give reasons in writing for refusing to call a witness at a prison disciplinary
hearing).
132. See APA, 5 U.S.C. S 7o6(2)(A) (2000) (providing that courts should review agency action
under the standard of "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law" unless the action consists of formal rulemaking or adjudication).
133. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 1O
HARv. L. REV. 915 (1988) (advancing an "appellate review" theory for decisions made by
non-Article III tribunals including administrative courts).
134. See, e.g., Echevarria v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that the ALJ has a heightened duty to "scrupulously and conscientiously" explore
all the relevant facts when the individual is not represented by counsel).
218o Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:2148 2006
MAKING THE NO FLY LIST FLY
attorney-client interaction. The ALJ appointed to conduct the hearing should
be given the opportunity to evaluate and monitor the advocate's representation
of his client. On review, Article III judges would have the record before them to
evaluate the effectiveness of the attorney's advocacy. Judicial review would thus
create incentives both for the compensatory counsels to zealously protect the
interests of their clients, and for government-paid administrative judges to
remain neutral.
But the real responsibility for protecting Americans' constitutional liberties
lies with Congress. There are several reasons for Congress to err on the side of
granting procedural protections for deprivations of liberty based on watchlists.
This Note demonstrates that it is possible for the government to devise
procedures that protect the nation's security while protecting individual
liberties at the same time. Because extra procedural protections occur after the
revocation or suspension of the transportation-sector activity that has resulted
in the threat assessment, the commitment to civil liberties and constitutionality
does not conflict with the government's primary interest in security. And
finally, members of Congress, no less than federal judges, have an obligation to
protect and uphold the Constitution.
While this Note has focused on the transportation security context, the
proposed process offers a useful model for other watchlists, as well as other
cases in which the government does not wish to disclose classified or sensitive
information to suspected terrorists. As technology improves and homeland
security remains a pressing concern, the use of watchlists will continue to
expand. With new intelligence-gathering and data-mining programs, the
federal government has access to vast quantities of information about
Americans on which to make security determinations. With the REAL ID Act,
Congress has taken a step toward requiring uniform identification cards for all
Americans. With the Registered Traveler, US-Visit, and TWIC programs, the
government has demonstrated the capability of combining biometric
identification cards with terrorist watchlists. It is not hard to imagine a world
in which Americans have their names checked against a watchlist before
swiping a Metrocard, entering an office building, or taking money from an
ATM machine. In the face of such potentially troubling developments,
members of Congress should act now to provide Americans adversely affected
by terrorist watchlists with meaningful due process. Otherwise, as Senator
Kennedy and Representative Young can attest, they may not make their next
flights home from Washington.
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